TLS pinning
The agent-to-agent path uses self-signed TLS certificates pinned in the DID document. The Web PKI path is reserved for human-facing endpoints (gateway, SaaS, tunnel endpoints) where browsers need a trust anchor.
Why
Web PKI encodes trust in certificate authorities. ARP encodes trust in DIDs. Delegating agent identity to a CA would flatten that into Web PKI and lose the sovereignty story. Pinning the fingerprint in the DID document keeps the agent's identity and its TLS identity co-located.
How
The sidecar generates an ed25519 keypair and a matching self-signed cert
on first boot. The cert fingerprint is embedded in the DID document under
the service block of the DIDComm endpoint. A calling agent fetches the
DID document, extracts the fingerprint, and refuses the connection if the
presented cert does not match.
Normative rules
- The fingerprint MUST be the SHA-256 of the DER-encoded cert, multibase-
encoded with prefix
z. - Clients MUST fail closed on fingerprint mismatch.
- Rotation: the old fingerprint remains in the DID document for a 30-day grace window after a cert rotation event is announced.
This page is a v0.1 placeholder. Full normative prose lands before v1.0.